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Equality of opportunity is an ethical goal with almost universal appeal. The interpretation 
taken here is that a society has achieved equality of opportunity if it is the case that what 
individuals accomplish, with respect to some desirable objective, is determined wholly by 
their choices and personal effort, rather than by circumstances beyond their control. We use 
data for Swedish men born between 1955 and 1967 for whom we measure the distribution of 
long-run income, as well as several important background circumstances, such as parental 
education and income, family structure and own IQ before adulthood. We address the 
question: in Sweden, given its present constellation of social policies and institutions, to what 
extent is existing income inequality due to circumstances, as opposed to ‘effort’? Our results 
suggest that several circumstances, importantly both parental income and own IQ, are 
important for long-run income inequality, but that variations in individual effort account for the 
most part of that inequality. 
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Equality of opportunity is an ethical goal with almost universal appeal. There are,
however, myriad interpretations of what the phrase should mean. In one contem-
porary interpretation, a society has achieved equality of opportunity if it is the case
that what individuals accomplish, with respect to some desirable objective, is de-
termined wholly by their choices and personal effort, rather than by circumstances
beyond their control (Arneson, 1989; Cohen, 1989; Roemer, 1993, 1998). Roe-
mer (1998) proposed a way of formalizing this concept, as follows. Suppose that
the objective in question, achieved by individuals, is a function u(x;e;t), where x
is the value of a policy chosen by the state, e is the effort the individual expends
towards achieving the goal, and t is an index deﬁning the circumstances of the in-
dividual. We suppose that the society is partitioned into a ﬁnite number of types,
t, where each type comprises individuals with the same circumstances. For exam-
ple, suppose u measures the income of a worker, t indexes his family background,
and e is his level of education. The policy could be one of educational ﬁnance,
where the policy space is X, and x 2 X describes some allocation of educational
resources to students in the society (before they become workers earning income),
perhaps as a function of their circumstances.
The function u is not an individual utility function: indeed, generally it is the
case that the effort e enters negatively into individual preferences – but it enters
positively into u. The role of individual preferences is suppressed in the present
formulation. Instead, we take as data the following: given any policy x, there
will ensue in each type t a distribution of effort, which we denote Gt
x(e). This
distribution is, of course, determined by the maximization of preference orders by
individuals, but all that we need is summarized in the ‘reduced form’ of these dis-
tributions. We equalize opportunities for achievement of the objective measured
by u in this society when we choose the policy x that makes the distribution of
outcomes u as insensitive as possible to circumstances, measured by t. That is,
outcomes should be sensitive to effort, but not to circumstances.
A familiar example of this approach is prevalent in the intergenerational mo-
bility literature. A familiar ethical goal is that the rows of the intergenerational
mobility matrix be equal: that is, distribution of income of children should be
independent of their parents’ income.
Denote by jt
x(p) the inverse function of Gt
x, where p 2 [0;1] is the quantile of
the distribution of effort in his type at which an individual sits, when the policy




Note that the function vt(;x) is simply the inverse function of the (cumulative)
distribution of the objective in type t at policy x. This is a useful formulation, be-
cause it shows that the outcome for the individual depends upon his circumstances
through two channels: ﬁrst, the ‘direct’ effect of his circumstances, through the
third argument of u, and second, an indirect effect, through the effect of his cir-
cumstances on the distribution of effort in his type (the second argument of u).
With regard to this indirect contribution, it is generally the case that one’s circum-
stances affect one’s preferences (and hence one’s choices of effort), and if a person
is not to be held responsible for his circumstances, then he should not be held re-
sponsible for the distribution of preferences, and hence of effort, in his type. Thus,
an equal-opportunity policy should hold people only partially responsible for their
choices: they are responsible, in a word, for where on the distribution of effort in
their type they sit, but not for the properties of the distribution itself (such as its
median, mean, and variance).
Thus, we measure the ethically relevant degree of a person’s effort by the value
of p, not the value of e. The function v is the one that is useful in this theory. To
equalize opportunities means to choose the policy x which renders the functions
vt(;x)jt = 1;2;:::;T as close to each other as possible. If we could render these
functions identical, then a person’s prospects for achieving the objective would
depend only on his or her effort choice, not circumstances. Inequalities due to
differential effort, as deﬁned here, are not considered undesirable by this ethic.
The literature contains a number of measures of the closeness of these func-
tions (see Roemer, 2004). The simplest version is to attempt to equalize the means
ofthesefunctionsacrosst, ormoregenerally, tomaximizetheminimumof(“max-
imin”) these means. That is, the equal opportunity policy x is that one which








We now describe our project in the present paper. We are not, here, inter-
ested in choosing an equal-opportunity policy, but in asking: in Sweden, given its
present constellation of social policies and institutions, to what extent is existing
income inequality due to circumstances, as opposed to ‘effort’? That is, to what
extent has Sweden succeeded in equalizing opportunities for income acquisition?
While there is a growing literature on computing equal-opportunity policies, with
2respect to various objectives, and in various countries, it is usually the case that the
set of circumstances chosen is quite small, and the number of types into which the
population is partitioned is likewise small. This is due to the paucity of good data
during adolescence. Thus, in these studies, probably too much of existing inequal-
ity is observed as being due to effort, and too little to circumstances, because the
set of circumstances observed is only a small proper subset of the true set of cir-
cumstances. Sweden, on the contrary, possesses a longitudinal data set, described
in section 2, which permits us to observe many circumstances for the male popu-
lation during childhood. We are able to partition the population into types deﬁned
by parental income during childhood (4 levels), parental education (3 levels), own
IQ during adolescence (4 levels)1, number of siblings (3 levels), body mass index
during adolescence (4 levels) and family structure (2 kinds): thus, a partition of
the population into 1152 types. Call these ﬁve characteristics of a person’s envi-
ronment the direct circumstances affecting him or her. The objective we choose
is the income of the individual, and we deﬁne effort as the residual determinant
of income after these circumstances are accounted for. Since our data consist of
more than one third of the total population of Swedish males, we have enough
observations in all 1152 cells to construct meaningful functions vt(), where we
now suppress x, since we are observing these outcomes at one existing ‘policy’.
In terms of the theory explained above, we are interested in knowing how close
these functions are to each other, across t.
Rather than using some metric on the space of functions to answer this ques-
tion, we take a less abstract approach. Consider a measure of income inequality,
such as the Gini coefﬁcient. We can consider this inequality as due to the contri-
butions of the various circumstances, and the contribution of effort, the residual.
Note, however, that it is important to measure this residual after the effect of cir-
cumstances upon the error term in an econometric regression of income upon the
circumstances has been taken into account. Thus we must include as one circum-
stance, the effect of the direct circumstances upon the residual. Let us call the
residual, sterilized of the effect of the direct circumstances upon it, the sterilized
residual. We view the Gini coefﬁcient (and several other measures of inequality)
1There is much debate on whether IQ, tested during adolescence, is due to nature or nurture.
We need take no position on the nature-nurture issue; see Björklund et al. (2007) for some Swedish
evidence on that issue. The question we need to address is if IQ can properly be considered a
circumstance, something for which we should not hold the individual responsible. As we discuss
below, this is potentially controversial. We take here the view that even if it may reﬂect some prior
effort, we should still not hold individuals responsible to their characteristics at such a young age
and thus treating IQ as a circumstance is justiﬁed.
3as created by contributions of the direct circumstances, the effect of the direct cir-
cumstances on effort, and the sterilized residual, and we model this construction
of the Gini as a cooperative game; the Shapley value of this game assigns to each
circumstance, and to sterilized effort, its relative contribution to total inequality.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data we use, and
in Section 3 we describe our empirical approach. Section 4 reports the results for
both our full sample as well as two different cohorts of men. In the concluding
section, we summarize our ﬁndings, and compare the results to what has been
found by other authors.
2 Data
In order to examine the role of circumstances and effort on the distribution of
long-run income, we must deﬁne the data and variables that allow such an anal-
ysis. Thus, we start with a sample of Swedish men who have been linked to
their parents, with rich data on the incomes, education and other socio-economic
characteristics of both generations. The key concept is that of circumstance. Cir-
cumstances are captured by partitioning the population (and sample) into discrete
types, each of which has a particular set of circumstantial background charac-
teristics. The key idea is that an individual should not be held accountable for
outcomes that vary because of type.
Samples and source registers In order to achieve our goals, we exploit a com-
bination of Swedish administrative register data sets. A ﬁrst and basic source is
Statistics Sweden’s so-called Multi-generational register. This is a register of all
persons who were born 1932 and onward, and who have ever received a unique
national registration number from 1961 and onward.2 For the Swedish popula-
tion deﬁned in this way, the register contains information about biological (and
adoptive) parents and their national registration number. From this information,
one can also infer which individuals are related as siblings; full siblings are those
who have the same father and mother, half siblings are those who only have one
parent in common. Our analysis sample is a 35 percent random sample of the
Swedish male population born 1955-67 deﬁned in this register. We also use the
Multi-generational register to identify parents and siblings.
2The requirement that the persons must have been registered in Sweden from 1961 and onward
impliesthatpersonswhodiedbetween1932and1960arenotincluded. Forourpurposes, however,
this is not a problem since we want to observe outcomes in the 1990s and 2000s.
4The second source is the set of bidecennial censuses conducted from 1960 to
1980. Wecanidentifyourmainsampleofsonsinthehouseholdsofthesecensuses
as well as other persons in the household. Thus we can determine whether our
offspring generation lived with their biological parents or not in the fall of these
census years.
The third source is Statistics Sweden’s income register, which in turn come
from the Swedish tax assessment procedure. A limitation is that such data are
available only from 1968 onwards. From that year the income register provides
data on total income from all sources of income, from work, self employment,
capital, real estate as well as some transfers (from 1974 onward). We use such
income data for both parents and sons. The earlier data for parents stem from
their own compulsory tax assessments. In later years, when we measure sons’
incomes, the source of the data is compulsory reports by employers to the tax
authorities.
The fourth source is the Swedish Military Enlistment Battery, which provides
ameasureofintellectualcapacity. ThepurposeofthesetestsistoclassifySwedish
men to different military positions with different demands on general intellectual
capacity. For the cohorts who now are adults, military service was compulsory in
Sweden with only few exceptions. Generally, the tests were done during the year
when men turned 18 years of age. The Enlistment Battery contained four cog-
nitive tests: instructions, synonyms, metal folding and technical comprehension.
The subtests were designed to measure the primary IQ factors Induction, Verbal
Comprehension, Spatial Ability and Technical Comprehension respectively. We
use a summary measure of intellectual ability based on the four tests provided by
the military organization that runs the tests.3 The Enlistment Battery also provides
measures of height and weight, which we use to calculate the body mass index,
BMI.
To construct our analysis sample, we make use of the fact that all four data
sources contain the unique Swedish national registration number, by means of
which we can merge the information from the four sources.
Variables As our outcome variable for sons we use a measure of total market
income before taxes provided by Statistics Sweden. It includes income from all
sources, that is, labor, business, capital, realized capital gains as well as some
taxable social transfers such as unemployment insurance, sickness pay, parental
3Mårdberg & Carlstedt (1998) and Carlstedt (2000) provide more information on the cognitive
tests we use. See also Björklund et al. (2010) for additional information.
5leave payment, and pensions. We use the average of real total income over the
years when sons were 32-38 years of age. At these ages, we are likely to get
a good estimate of long-run income (see Böhlmark & Lindquist, 2006). Further,
averaging over as long a period as seven years is likely to eliminate most transitory
income variation that is not relevant for our purposes.
Our 5 background characteristics are
1. parental income quartile group (4 groups)
2. parental education group (3 groups)
3. family structure/type (2 groups)
4. number of siblings (3 groups)
5. IQ quartile groups (4 groups)
6. body mass index quartile group (4 groups)
the combination of which gives us T = 1152 types.
For parental income we apply the same income concept as for sons. We use
a multi-year average of the sum of the two biological parents’ incomes during the
years when the son was 13-17 years old. We treat an income observation of SEK
100 or lower (in 2005 prices) as missing, so the over-time average is only taken
for non-zero income. This measure we divide into four quartile groups of equal
size.
To measure parental education, we make use of the fact that the 1970 census
made special effort to collect information about education. We use the educational
level of the biological parent who has the highest educational level according the
information in the census. This level in turn, we split into three groups: only
compulsory school, more than compulsory school but no college, and at least
some college.
We also use the censuses to construct a family type indicator. This is equal to
one if the son lived with both biological parents during its ﬁrst three censuses in
life. For example, for the cohort born in 1955 this implies that we require that the
son lived with both biological parents in the 1960, 1965, and 1970 censuses. If
this condition is not fulﬁlled, the indicator takes on the value zero.
We use data from the Multi-generational register to compute the number of
full biological siblings. We split the observations into three groups: 0, 1-2 or 3+
siblings.
6For IQ, we split the summary measure of intellectual ability from the Military
Enlistment Battery into four quartile groups The use of own IQ as a circumstance,
as opposed to effort, is potentially controversial, for several reasons. First, cogni-
tive test scores at age 18 are very likely affected by educational choices up to that
age. Moreover, to some extent such choices, and performance within the chosen
educational path, reﬂect effort on the part of the young individual making them.
However, the key here is the following. We deﬁne as a circumstance factors that
affect socio-economic outcomes, but for which we do not hold the individual re-
sponsible. Your actions and effort prior to the age of 18, even if they in part reﬂect
yourambitionsandmotivations, arenotsomethingwewouldholdyouresponsible
for.
Body Mass Index is calculated from height and weight as measured at military
enlistment, and broken down into quartile groups.
The deﬁnitions imply that we need to make some sample restrictions. Impor-
tantly, our reliance on military enlistment data necessitates an exclusive focus on
men. We acknowledge that by so doing we exclude one important circumstance,
namely gender. We also focus on those persons born in Sweden, as the informa-
tion on the parents of foreign-born inhabitants can be quite sketchy and unreliable.
We also only include persons for whom both the biological mother and biological
father are non-missing in the Multigeneration register.
Descriptives Table 1 shows the number of observations, the mean, standard de-
viation and maximum of sons’ long-run incomes for each birth cohort and the
whole sample. Table 2 shows the the same statistics for parental income for each
cohort of sons. We should note that for the 1960 cohort is small due to a high
attrition in the military data for this cohort.4 Moreover, the 1967 cohort contains
some outliers, which with the result that their standard deviation jumps quite sub-
stantially and is more than twice as high as that for any other cohort.5
Table 3 shows the distribution of types across cohorts. We do have some
“drift” across cohorts across the distribution of parental income and education, in
that the younger cohorts enjoy disproportionately higher income and education.
The fact that the IQ type distribution is quite skewed is explained by the fact
that we use the military test results scaled on the “stanine” scale, i.e., discrete
4Cesarini (2009) investigates if this attrition is selective, and ﬁnds that it is not. We have
experimented with eliminating the entire 1960 cohort from the analyzes altogether, and the results
were not substantially different.
5The most likely explanation for those high numbers is realized capital gains during the end of
the period.
7Table 1 Descriptives, sons’ long-run incomes
birthyear N Mean Std Min Max
1955 16197 234323 153036 0 1:20e+07
1956 16821 234624 140900 0 9:73e+06
1957 16505 235187 149659 0 1:23e+07
1958 16480 236790 139746 0 9:18e+06
1959 16307 236880 143962 0 5:10e+06
1960 2442 243834 173219 0 3:70e+06
1961 14469 248740 168657 0 5:34e+06
1962 16791 259540 242082 0 1:38e+07
1963 17953 274663 353906 0 2:35e+07
1964 19187 282622 407151 0 3:76e+07
1965 18988 286325 448066 0 4:06e+07
1966 18477 290906 222853 0 7:39e+06
1967 18346 308531 1263642 0 1:68e+08
ALL 208963 262090 452580 0 1:68e+08
8Table 2 Descriptives, parental long-run incomes
birthyear N Mean Std Min Max
1955 16197 299131 200042 712 6126417
1956 16821 300450 180593 241 3987879
1957 16505 311492 177863 241 3043500
1958 16480 322165 215743 157 13788115
1959 16307 331482 197420 365 9853299
1960 2442 335869 171774 4462 2497343
1961 14469 351258 213342 478 14552906
1962 16791 358252 177239 510 7428959
1963 17953 358926 203160 1326 14344192
1964 19187 355404 168743 241 7025543
1965 18988 351733 169366 273 6260280
1966 18477 349116 155384 1060 2742221
1967 18346 345727 184995 196 13079620

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10integers from 0-9, which generates a very lumpy distribution. In particular, the
ﬁrst and third quartiles include scale values 4 and 7 respectively, which leads to
disproportionate mass in those quartile groups.
Next, we show the cumulative distribution of income, our vt(p), for a few
selected types. For each ﬁgure, we have set the other characteristics in the middle
category, and display the separate CDF for types that vary only across the selected
characteristic.6 We show 3 such ﬁgures, one for types by parental education,
parental income quartile group, and own IQ quartile group.
From the Figures 1 to 3, we see something interesting. Except for Figure 3,
which varies IQ type, it’s the case that median income for the various types is
almost the same. Look, e.g., at Figure 2, which varies parental education. The
divergence of the CDFs occurs mainly in the upper part of the income distribution.
For IQ, this is not so – divergence occurs even at low levels of ’effort.’
It is not easy to tell why these patterns occur. Perhaps ’social connections’ of
the parents are important for ’high parental income’ and ’high parental education’,
which have big payoffs at the upper end of child distribution of income. In other
words, social connections of high-status parents can increase child’s income, but
either only a fraction of high-status parents use their social connections, or social
connections are effective only if the child has certain (industrious) qualities. But
IQ, which is most closely tied to merit (in the sense of ability) has a more or less
continuous effect on the individual’s income.
Our speculation on the importance of parental connections is inspired, in part,
by work by Corak & Piraino (2011) that examines the extent to which sons in
Canada have worked in the same ﬁrm as their fathers. While the fraction of father-
son pairs who have shared the same employer (deﬁned in a few alternative ways)
is surprisingly high overall, this probability increases sharply once the focus is
on fathers in the upper end of the income distribution. This is consistent with
a few different explanations, but social connections and nepotism is prominent
among them. A comparison of Canada and Denmark suggests remarkably similar
patterns in the two countries (Bingley et al., 2010), which leads us to speculate
this might also be the case in Sweden.
Moreover, Björklund et al. (2010) ﬁnd that the intergenerational elasticity of
father-son income increases sharply at the very top of the income distribution,
results that are consistent with patterns of the more general convex relationship
between the ln of income of father’s and son’s in Denmark, Finland and Norway
6Speciﬁcally, we choose FamilyType=1, IQType=3, ParentEducType=2, ParentIncType=3,
SibType=2 and BMIType=3.
11Figure 1 Income distribution (CDF) among example types (vt(p)): by level of
parental education (labels: 1=only compulsory; 2=more than compulsory, no col-
lege; 3=at least some college)
CDFs across different types of ParentEducType






























































12Figure 2 Income distribution (CDF) among example types (vt(p)): by level of
parental income (labels indicate quartile group of a multi-year average of parental
income)
CDFs across different types of ParentIncType































































13Figure 3 Income distribution (CDF) among example types (vt(p)): by level of
own IQ (labels indicate quartile group of military enlistment cognitive test result)
CDFs across different types of IQType































































14(Bratsberg et al., 2007).
Thus, the evidence in Figures 1 and 2 of little dependence of long-run income
on parental socio-economic status at the lower end of the distribution, and close to
equal median incomes, but large income advantages toward the low end, is con-
sistent with several pieces of recent evidence on intergenerational socio-economic
transmission.
The continuity of IQ is also interesting, since it operates across the whole
distribution in a close to homogenous way. Taken with the graphs that distinguish
between parental income types, the connection of IQ with the outcomes appears
to be much more straightforward as the advantage bestowed by having higher IQ
(or traits that are highly correlated with it that are rewarded in the labour markets)
operates throughout the income distribution.
3 Methods
The approach we take is based on Keane & Roemer (2009), Betts & Roemer
(2007) and Lee (2008). We are interested in what fraction of the inequality of
long-run income, Y, which has distribution FY, can be attributable to circum-
stances and what can be attributable to effort. Circumstances are captured by
partitioning the population (and sample) into discrete types, each of which has a
particular set of circumstantial background characteristics. The key idea is that an
individual should not be held accountable for outcomes that vary because of type.
Denote each of the J background characteristics by Xj, which can take Kj spe-
ciﬁc values (see Section 2). Each type t consists of a particular cell or collection







6). The type of a particular sample member is Xt
i.
We now outline a version that takes effort to be the deviation of long-run in-
come from the expected income of a person of type t, E[YjXt] from actual income
















7Note that we regress the natural logarithm of long-run income rather than its level on X as this
is conventional in earnings regressions. Results using the level rather than the natural logarithm
are similar to those we report here.
15where the second row uses the more conventional notation with each separate
characteristic being a set of dummy variables. The two formulations are inter-
changeable, but the latter is what we actually use in regressions.
We next measure the role of each circumstance, and of effort, by a Shapley-
value decomposition of the inequality index I(FY). The above implementation
takes the “raw” residual from an empirically estimated version of equation (3) as
a measure of effort.
The problem with this is that the distribution of et
i may vary across types, that
is, it can be heterogeneous. Each type is characterized by an expected/average
income, captured in equation (3) as the deviation of that type’s income from the
overall average (i.e., E[lnYjXt] = µ+Ind[i is of type t]b
t. Each type may in ad-
dition be characterized by a different distribution of effort et, Ft
e. As a person
should not be held accountable for her circumstances (captured by type), and Ft
e
is a consequence of being of type t, variations in e and therefore realized income
Y that are attributable to differences in Ft
e are also part of what a person can not
be held accountable for.
The solution to this in Betts & Roemer (2007) is to measure effort by being at
a particular quantile p in the distribution of effort among type t, and standardize
the distribution of effort to be the same across all types. That solution is not
available to us in this accounting exercise. How, then, should we take into account
differences in the distribution of effort?
The heterogeneity takes the form of heteroscedasticity. That is, each typet has
its own variance s2
t =Var[etjXt]. We address this by adding and subtracting to the
regression equation a residual term that has a homogenous variance. The most
natural candidate for standardizing the distribution across types is to choose the
overallvariance, which, sincetheexpectationoftheresidualiszeroinallgroupsis




allows us to distinguish between a residual whose variance varies across types,
and one that does not. It is this latter residual that we associate with individual
effort. Thus, we add one more background characteristic, namely the effect of
type on the variation of effort to our list of characteristics. Thus, we work with a
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where k = (1=
P
t fts2
t ) 1=2 = 1=s. Thus, ui has variance 1=k2 = s2 across all
types. This separates between standardized effort ui that is measured in terms of a
common distribution, and that part of efforte et
i = et
i ui that captures the inﬂuence
of type on the conditional variation of income around the expected value for each
type.
Implementing this is quite straightforward and involves estimating in the ﬁrst
step all b coefﬁcients and then, based on the OLS residuals the type-speciﬁc vari-
ances s2
t . In practice, however, some types have very few observations and/or
very small estimated variances, leading to very large standardized residuals ui.
For this reason, in our baseline case, we regress the estimated variances on the
background characteristics, and use the ﬁtted values from that regression as the
basis for et
i=kst. This procedure smooths out the more extreme values.
After we have run the regressions, we proceed with examining the importance
of each of the circumstances as well as effort on the distribution of income. A cir-
cumstance, such as parental education, is turned “on” or “off”. When it is “on”,
the circumstance takes on its actual variation in the population and affects long-
run income through its associated regression coefﬁcients. When it is “off”, we
eliminate variation due to the circumstance by replacing for every observation its
actual variation with the mean value – which equals mean of the average propor-
tion in each category of the circumstance multiplied by the estimated coefﬁcient.
The importance of a circumstance is measured by comparing the inequality of
long-run income (measured in levels, not natural logarithms) when the circum-
stance is “off” to when it is “on”.
Formally, from equation (3) a circumstance j contributes X0
jibj to income.
We compare inequality when we allow the circumstance to contribute X0
jib bj to
the income of individual i (providing the actual variation in the circumstance j
to income) with one in which we have replaced that by X
0
jb bj, thus eliminating
variation across individuals from that circumstance.
17The contribution of a circumstance to inequality in the above sense may de-
pend on the order in which inequality from that source is measured. This is a
well-known problem in inequality decompositions. We use here the Shapley-
value decomposition. Speciﬁcally, with J circumstances, and type-speciﬁc as well
as homogeneous effort, we have J+2 factors whose impact on inequality we want
to measure. We proceed as follows. We generate the powerset of the J+2 factors.
For each element in the powerset, we have a set of circumstances that vary, and
the rest are constant (except of course the empty set, with no circumstances that
vary, and the set of all circumstances, in which case all vary). We calculate our
inequality indices for each of the sets, by constructing the level of income for each
observation allowing the J+2 factors either to vary or not from the regression and
taking the antilog of the counterfactual ln income.
Then, for each of the circumstances, we take every element of the power-
set that does not include it, and compare inequality in that set with the set that
is otherwise identical but does include the circumstance. The importance of a
circumstance is measured as the normalized average of all such comparisons.8
The Shapley-value decomposition approach (Shorrocks, 1999) has several bene-
ﬁts. Among others, it results in an additive decomposition of inequality, i.e., the
sum of all contributions is the value of overall inequality.
This method is based on a discrete number of types. Yet, three of our variables
describing circumstances, namely parental income, IQ and BMI, are continuous.
In order to ﬁt these variables into our framework of discrete types, we have di-
vided them into groups (in this case four groups each). It might be argued that
this approach ignores some within-type variation in circumstances and thus un-
derestimates the importance of circumstances and overestimates the role of effort.
However, our use of types implies that our underlying regression model has a
quite ﬂexible functional form. We acknowledge that it is a challenging task for
future research to develop the analysis of equality of opportunity to the case of
continuous circumstances, see O’Neill et al. (2000) for an approach to do so in a
different setting than ours.
4 Results
Main results We provide three sets of results, distinguished by how they deal
with heterogeneity across types. Our baseline case allows heterogeneity across
8ThealgorithmisimplementedinthestatisticalprogramminglanguageR(Ihaka&Gentleman,
1996) using a few standard libraries and is available from the Markus Jäntti on request.
18types, but in estimating it, we regress the residual standard deviation of each type
on each circumstance (not including interactions) and use the ﬁt from that regres-
sion as our estimate of the standard deviation of each type. In one sensitivity
analysis, we use instead the type-speciﬁc residual standard deviation (except for
cells with fewer than 10 observations, for which we use the regression ﬁt). We
further examine the results of making no allowance for type-speciﬁc heterogene-
ity.
The results from the underlying regressions are reported in Table A 1. The
estimates are reasonable and some of them are substantial in magnitude. For ex-
ample, the coefﬁcients on the four IQTypes go from zero (the omitted case) to
.325 with small differences across cohorts. Further, the coefﬁcients on the four
ParentIncTypes go from zero to .206, also with small differences across cohorts.
The two family structure variables (parental separation and number of siblings)
also have sizeable coefﬁcients; growing up with both biological parents is associ-
ated with an income advantage of .071 log points. What is somewhat surprising
is that the coefﬁcients on parental education are so small, in some cases even in-
signiﬁcant and for the oldest cohort even with the “wrong” sign. As a sensitivity
analysis, we dropped parental income and re-estimated the equations. The coefﬁ-
cients for parental education became quite large, were strongly signiﬁcant and had
the “correct” sign. Thus, we conclude that parental income subsumes the impact
of education in the preferred regression.
The Shapley-value decomposition of inequality in our baseline case for all
cohorts as well as the “old” (1955-1959) and “young” (1963-1967) cohorts are
shown in Table 4. We measure inequality using four inequality indices, namely
the Gini coefﬁcient, two members of the Generalized Entropy-class of measures
(GE(0) and GE(1), corresponding to the log mean deviation and the so-called
Theil(1) measure of inequality, as well as the squared coefﬁcient of variation CV2.
which in turn is 2  GE(2). Each panel shows the value of the inequality index in
the top row, followed by the percentage contribution of each factor in the subse-
quent rows.
Focusing on the shares of each factor in overall inequality, it appears that the
threemostimportantcontributorstoinequalityofopportunityareparentalincome,
IQ, and the type heterogeneity of effort. The relative importance of each of these
varies across measures and this most likely varies in importance across the dis-
tribution of income. For instance, parental income accounts for 7.1 percent of
the Gini coefﬁcient, while IQ type and type heterogeneity (i.e., differences in the
variance of the residual) account for 11.5 and 5.1 percent, respectively. Compare
this to the CV2, for which parental income accounts for 5.4, IQ for 3.8 and type
19Table 4 Contribution of types to overall inequality of long-run average income –
for all cohorts (Panel A) and for cohorts born 1955-1959 (Panel B) and 1963-1967
(Panel C) – heterogeneous effort controlled using smoothed residual variance
A. All (born 1955-1967)
Gini GE(0) GE(1) CV2
Index value
0:257 0:150 0:159 2:196
Relative contributions
ParentIncType 7:1 2:8 3:2 5:4
ParentEducType 0:4 0:1 0:1 0:1
IQType 11:5 4:9 4:9 3:8
SibType 0:9 0:2 0:3 0:6
FamilyType 1:7 0:5 0:3  2:2
BMIType 0:8 0:1 0:2 0:4
Type heterogeneity 5:1 2:6 7:3 24:5
Residual 72:6 88:7 83:8 67:4
B. Cohorts born 1955-1959
Gini GE(0) GE(1) CV2
Index value
0:228 0:120 0:104 0:320
Relative contributions
ParentIncType 7:2 2:8 3:2 2:1
ParentEducType 0:0  0:2  0:2  0:2
IQType 11:1 4:6 5:4 4:5
SibType 0:7 0:2 0:2 0:1
FamilyType 1:8 0:6 0:7 0:8
BMIType 0:9 0:2 0:2 0:4
Type heterogeneity 4:3 0:8 2:2 3:8
Residual 74:1 91:0 88:4 88:6
C. Cohorts born 1963-1967
Gini GE(0) GE(1) CV2
Index value
0:270 0:166 0:189 3:034
Relative contributions
ParentIncType 5:7 2:1 1:7 0:1
ParentEducType 0:3 0:1 0:1 0:0
IQType 12:6 5:3 4:5  0:6
SibType 0:8 0:2 0:3 0:6
FamilyType 2:3 0:7 0:7 1:1
BMIType 0:7 0:1 0:1 0:2
Type heterogeneity 6:4 4:1 12:1 32:0
Residual 71:3 87:4 80:7 66:6
20variation for 24.5 percent of the total. For the GE(0), by contrast, parental income
accounts for 2.8, IQ for 4.9 and type variation for 2.6 percent of the total. As the
GE(0) is sensitive to income differences at the low end, the Gini to the middle and
the CV2 to the top, these differences suggest that type variation is quite important
at the high end of the distribution of outcomes, while IQ may matter more at the
low end and middle of the distribution. On this interpretation, parental income
may be relatively important throughout the distribution. The residual, which is
supposed to capture effort, is very important, accounting for between 2/3 (CV2)
and almost 90 (GE(0)) percent of the inequality of long-run income.
In Panels B and C of Table 4, we show the results for cohorts born between
1955-59 and 1963-67, to capture change across time in the importance in circum-
stances. The results suggest that parental income is an important circumstance
in both cohorts, as is IQ. An exception to this is the CV2 in the later cohort, for
which parental income matters very little and for which IQ gives a negative con-
tribution. This may be driven by a few outlying observations in the very youngest
cohorts – see Table 1 – which have a very large inﬂuence on the CV2. Indeed, the
point estimate for the CV2 increases by a factor of ten between the two cohorts.
Moreover, almost one third of this very large increase is captured by the hetero-
geneity across types. For the older cohorts, type variation captured between 0.8
to 4.3 percent of the inequality of long-run income, while own IQ accounted for
between 4.5 and 11.1 percent, and parental income accounted for between 2.1 and
7.2 percent of inequality. On the whole, type heterogeneity is more important for
the younger cohort. We have not been able to come up with an explanation for
this result.
Sensitivity analysis We show, below, results from varying our treatment of het-
erogeneity. In particular, it clearly is worthwhile to pay attention to the hetero-
geneity in the distribution of effort across types.
Using actual rather than regression-smoothed standard deviations to measure
heterogeneity across types does not change our results very much (cf. Table 4
and 5). The roles of heterogeneity, parental income and IQ are largely similar
to that found in our baseline case. Things look quite different when we examine
the old and young cohorts separately, in Panels B and C of Table 5. As earlier,
heterogeneity across types is relatively unimportant in the older cohorts, born be-
tween 1955 and 1959, although heterogeneity across types contributes negatively
to GE(1). But for the younger cohorts, heteoregeneity across types has a much
smaller contribution than in the corresponding analysis using the smoothed stan-
21dard deviations (cf Table 4) and the contribution is negative for both the GE(0)
and GE(1). We interpret this as being driven by several extreme residual variance
estimates within quite small cells and, rather than tinkering with the size of cells
for which we use the regression smooths (currently n=10) we prefer the use of the
smoothed estimates altogether.
If, instead, we ignore heterogeneity across types, parental income and own IQ
are still the most important circumstances, and appear so quite robustly both in
the full set of cohorts and in the young and old cohorts separately (see Table 6).
Of course, effort, as captured by the now quite heterogeneous regression resid-
ual, captures a greater share of the variation. However, as we saw, accounting
for variations in the distribution of effort, by distinguishing between hetero- and
homoscedastic residual variation, captures a substantial part of the variation that
is now ascribed to variations in individual effort.
5 Conclusions
The single starkest ﬁnding of our analysis is that at least two thirds, and generally
over 70 percent of the income inequality in Sweden is due to our residual term,
which we have called ‘effort,’ and this is so even after we have accounted for a
set of circumstances that is about as complete as one can expect to compile, given
existing data sets. Importantly, we have sterilized the error term of the effect of
direct circumstances upon it.
The important role of ‘effort’ in explaining inequality is a mark of the high
level of development of Sweden. If we conceive of economic development as
a process which enhances the degree of distributive justice in a society, and if
equality of opportunity, as here conceived of, comprises justice, then Sweden has
moved a great distance towards distributive justice. The recent work by de Barros
et al. (2009) computes the degree to which circumstances explain inequalities of
various kinds in 28 Latin American countries: it is not unusual for circumstances
to account for between 30 and 50% of inequality, and this is so even though their
data do not permit measurement of the extensive set of circumstances which we
have been able to deﬁne for Sweden. So if, with our 1152 types, only at most one
third, and in general less, of inequality is due to circumstances in Sweden, that is
a great social accomplishment. de Barros et al. (2009) do not have access to own
IQ, which turned out to be important in our study. On the other hand, as do we,
they did have access to family structure variables, which are typically missing in
22Table 5 Contribution of types to overall inequality – heterogeneous effort con-
trolled using the actual residual variance for all cohorts and for cohorts born 1955-
1959 and 1963-1967
A. All (born 1955-1967)
Gini GE(0) GE(1) CV2
Index value
0:257 0:150 0:159 2:196
Relative contributions
ParentIncType 6:8 2:8 3:1 4:9
ParentEducType 0:4 0:1 0:1 0:1
IQType 11:0 4:9 4:9 3:5
SibType 0:9 0:2 0:3 0:6
FamilyType 1:6 0:5 0:3  1:8
BMIType 0:8 0:1 0:2 0:4
Type heterogeneity 6:6 1:7 5:4 29:4
Residual 72:0 89:6 85:7 63:0
B. Cohorts born 1955-1959
Gini GE(0) GE(1) CV2
Index value
0:228 0:120 0:104 0:320
Relative contributions
ParentIncType 6:8 2:8 3:1 1:8
ParentEducType 0:0  0:2  0:2  0:1
IQType 10:5 4:6 5:4 4:3
SibType 0:7 0:2 0:2 0:1
FamilyType 1:7 0:6 0:7 0:7
BMIType 0:9 0:2 0:2 0:3
Type heterogeneity 6:2 0:0  0:9 4:1
Residual 73:3 91:9 91:5 88:8
C. Cohorts born 1963-1967
Gini GE(0) GE(1) CV2
Index value
0:270 0:166 0:189 3:034
Relative contributions
ParentIncType 5:4 2:1 1:7 0:2
ParentEducType 0:3 0:1 0:1 0:0
IQType 11:9 5:3 4:3  1:2
SibType 0:8 0:2 0:2 0:6
FamilyType 2:2 0:7 0:8 1:4
BMIType 0:7 0:1 0:1 0:2
Type heterogneity 6:2  0:7  1:3 9:9
Residual 72:5 92:2 94:1 88:8
23Table 6 Contribution of types to overall inequality – no heterogeneity of effort
correction for all cohorts and for cohorts born 1955-1959 and 1963-1967
A. All (born 1955-1967)
Gini GE(0) GE(1) CV2
Index value
0:262 0:156 0:175 2:970
Relative contributions
ParentIncType 7:9 3:5 4:7 7:2
ParentEducType 0:5 0:2 0:2 0:2
IQType 12:5 5:8 7:2 11:7
SibType 1:0 0:3 0:3 0:7
FamilyType 1:6 0:3 0:3 0:9
BMIType 0:9 0:1 0:2 0:5
Residual 75:6 89:8 87:0 78:8
B. Cohorts born 1955-1959
Gini GE(0) GE(1) CV2
Index value
0:231 0:122 0:111 0:379
Relative contributions
ParentIncType 8:0 3:4 5:0 7:4
ParentEducType  0:1  0:2  0:4  0:6
IQType 12:0 5:1 6:5 5:8
SibType 0:8 0:2 0:2 0:2
FamilyType 1:7 0:4 0:5 0:7
BMIType 1:0 0:1 0:1 0:2
Residual 76:6 90:9 88:0 86:3
C. Cohorts born 1963-1967
Gini GE(0) GE(1) CV2
Index value
0:276 0:175 0:219 5:074
Relative contributions
ParentIncType 6:5 2:8 3:8 6:1
ParentEducType 0:3 0:2 0:2 0:5
IQType 13:9 6:7 8:3 13:1
SibType 0:9 0:2 0:3 0:7
FamilyType 2:2 0:5 0:5 1:4
BMIType 0:8 0:1 0:2 0:3
Residual 75:3 89:4 86:8 77:9
24related studies.9
Moreover, if we take the longer historical view, it is clear that time’s arrow
points in the direction of increasing equality of opportunity. Capitalism destroyed
one great cause of inequality of opportunity, feudal relations, and replaced it, at
least to some degree, with meritocracy. As we have seen, the meritocracy is highly
imperfect, especially in countries at low levels of development. Even in Sweden,
however, parental income remains a signiﬁcant correlate of child success. One
might surmise that the effect of parental income is, nevertheless, meritocratic, in
the sense that high-resource families imbue their children with skills which are
valuable in a market economy. Our earlier remarks on Figures 1, 2 and 3 suggest
that this is not the entire story – that social connections of parents, which are more
akin to feudal remnants, remain important for child success. We believe this is an
important issue to pursue in further research.10
That IQ is the most signiﬁcant circumstance for explaining income in Sweden
is no surprise: for among the circumstances we have listed, IQ is the one which
most clearly measures merit, that is, capacities which are valuable in income-
producing activities. In market economies, it will be extremely difﬁcult, if not
impossible, to eliminate the correlation between IQ and income – especially the
correlation with pre-tax income, which is what we have measured here. Redis-
tributive taxation, and counting public goods as a contribution to income, would
naturally reduce the effect of IQ on disposable income.
It is also philosophically contentious to assert that a person’s income should
not, ethically speaking, be correlated with his or her intellectual capacity. Nat-
urally, there is the usual economic argument about markets being necessary to
achieve efﬁciency; but there is also the philosophical belief, held by many, that
a person deserves to beneﬁt from his inborn traits (which IQ partially or sub-
stantially reﬂect). This view has come to be known as self-ownership, and is
most prominently espoused by Nozick (1974). The equal-opportunity view, how-
ever, maintains that a person deserves to beneﬁt only by virtue of his freely
chosen effort, and hence, although it may be nearly impossible to eliminate the
correlation between IQ and income (since markets are surely necessary in com-
plex economies), that only means that the extent to which complex societies can
achieve distributive justice is limited. If the reader protests that there is no such
thing as freely chosen effort – if he or she is, in philosophical lingo, an incompati-
9See e.g. Checchi & Peragine (2010) and Bourguignon et al. (2007).
10See also Roemer (2004) for a discussion about cases when parental income is not necessarily
a circumstance.
25bilist11 – then equality of opportunity reduces to full outcome equality. We doubt,
however, that there is any society today that ascribes to this principle. Every soci-
ety reserves a role for personal responsibility, and its theory of equal opportunity
should be consonant with that view.
It is noteworthy that one of the most important circumstances, in our anal-
ysis, is what we have called the type variation of effort: namely, the effect of
circumstances on the distributions of effort within types. In Table 5, Panel A, this
accounts for 5.1% of Gini inequality: it accounts for 19% of total circumstantial
inequality (5.1/27.4). In other words, a substantial part of ‘choice’ should not be
considered voluntary, but is due to factors that are clearly beyond the control of
persons. For social policy, this is of great importance. It is also one of the most
difﬁcult ideas for ordinary citizens to understand. Conservative social policy is of-
ten justiﬁed by the view that individuals from disadvantaged types have bad habits
and exert low effort, and to some extent, this is surely true, politically incorrect as
it may be to say so. (A recent example is the prevalence of obesity among poor
people in many advanced countries.) The correct ethical posture towards such be-
haviors must be based upon an understanding of the extent to which they are due
to circumstances.
Even among those who ascribe to the general view of ‘responsibility – sen-
sitive egalitarianism,’ of which the ethic promoted in this paper is an instance,
there is disagreement on this issue. Dworkin (1981) and Fleurbaey (2009) ad-
vocate the view that if an adult ‘identiﬁes with his preferences’ then he should
be held responsible for the consequences of exercising them. Thus, these writers
would probably not agree to consider the type-variation in effort a circumstance.
But we ﬁnd their view untenable. If one’s preferences are themselves inﬂuenced
by disadvantage during the period of their formation, any sophisticated theory of
psychology should not hold the individual responsible for their consequences. Of
course, what these authors fear is that there is a danger of sacriﬁcing liberalism:
one could argue that a slippery slope leads from including the effect of circum-
stances on effort as a circumstance to denying people freedom of choice. To say
we must be aware of the slippery slope is not the same as saying that we should
assign the person complete responsibility for his preferences once he reaches the
age of consent. Slippery slopes should be treated with care, not abolished.
The measurement of the importance of family background based on sibling
11Incompatibilism is the view that a materialist view of causation is inconsistent with the exis-
tence of free will. Many (most?) political philosophers are compatibilists: they believe in materi-
alist causation, yet also in responsibility.
26correlations is similar to the approach in this paper. A sibling correlation provides
a lower bound on the importance of family and neighbourhood characteristics
in the variance of income in that it captures all inﬂuences that the siblings share.
Someofthoseinﬂuencescanbeobserveddirectly, likethetypesusedinthispaper,
but some can not, but still lead to brothers’ income being positively correlated
(see Solon, 1999). Part of what siblings may share is a propensity to exert effort –
e.g. because they were brought up to be ambitious. Thus, examination of sibling
correlations does address, although less explicitly, similar issues as our approach
here based on observable types. Interestingly, Björklund et al. (2009) estimate
that roughly one third of the variance in the log of long-run earnings in Sweden
can be attributed to family inﬂuences, a number quite similar to what we ﬁnd for
the CV2.
The two comments just offered – with respect to the contentious inclusion
of IQ and type-heterogeneity of effort as circumstances – are both made in the
interests of defending our analysis against an accusation that we have gone too
far. But there is another view, recently developed by Lefranc et al. (2009) that
would argue we have not gone far enough. These authors object to the procedure
of declaring the residual, after circumstances have been accounted for, as effort.
They maintain the residual reﬂects the effects of effort and luck. The point is well-
taken. What we cannot measure could just as well be due to luck as to effort. The
solution to this problem is to attempt to measure effort by a series of behaviors,
and then to ascribe the remaining residual to luck. Lefranc et al. (2009) attempt to
do so with French data. While we ﬁnd this an interesting approach, the Swedish
register data that we use do not offer rich possibilities to explore it further.
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30Table A 1 Regression results



























































































n 208351 82172 92594
k 15 15 15
s 0.629 0.57 0.662
Adj R2 0.0602 0.0547 0.0612
31